America First Arms Policy: What Priority Weapons Deliveries Mean for Taiwan's Deterrence

On February 6, 2026, President Donald Trump signed an executive order establishing the "America First Arms Transfer Strategy," a framework designed to prioritize foreign military sales to partners that invest rigorously in their own defense, occupy critical geography in US operational plans, and contribute to American economic security. The document names no specific country. It does not need to. For analysts tracking the Western Pacific, the policy reads like a checklist Taiwan has already completed.

The timing is significant. In December 2025, Taipei announced its intent to purchase an $11.1 billion weapons package from the United States — the largest in the history of the US-Taiwan defense relationship — including HIMARS rocket systems, advanced air defense platforms, and precision munitions. Beijing sanctioned 20 US defense companies and 10 executives in response. The question now is not whether the sale proceeds, but how quickly the systems arrive — and what that speed means for the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.

The Logic of Prioritization

Previous US arms transfer policies operated on a largely first-come, first-served basis, with delivery timelines driven by production schedules, congressional notification periods, and bureaucratic sequencing. The result was a system in which strategically vital partners sometimes waited years behind less urgent orders. Taiwan's experience has been illustrative: F-16V fighter deliveries, approved in 2019, were not completed until 2024. Stinger missile orders placed during heightened cross-strait tensions in 2022 faced multi-year backlogs created by Ukraine-related demand.

The America First framework replaces this queue-based model with a tiered prioritization system. The White House directive calls for "avoiding arms sales backlogs that would impact allies or partner readiness" and prioritizing transfers to partners that have "invested in their own self-defense and capabilities, have a critical role or geography in United States plans and operations, or contribute to our economic security."

Taiwan's case against these criteria is unusually strong. The island's defense budget has risen for nine consecutive years, reaching approximately 2.5% of GDP in fiscal year 2026 — a ratio that exceeds most NATO members and places Taiwan among the most defense-committed partners in the US security network. Taipei's indigenous defense investments — including the domestically built Hai Kun-class submarine, Hsiung Feng supersonic anti-ship missiles, and the Sky Bow III air defense system — demonstrate precisely the kind of self-reliance the America First strategy rewards.

Geography speaks for itself. Taiwan sits at the center of the first island chain, the strategic archipelago that channels naval traffic between the Pacific Ocean and the East and South China Seas. As Alexander Huang, chairman of Taiwan's Council of Strategic and Wargaming Studies, noted: "The basic logic is that the United States will only prioritize military assistance to countries that contribute their own defense rigorously, and Taiwan would fit itself into that category."

What Faster Delivery Actually Means

Speed of delivery is not merely a logistical convenience. In deterrence theory, it is a strategic variable. A weapons system that arrives in three years provides different deterrent value than the same system arriving in eighteen months. The gap between order and delivery is a window of relative vulnerability — a period during which an adversary knows the defender's capability is committed but not yet deployed.

The December 2025 package is specifically designed to fill gaps in Taiwan's asymmetric defense architecture. HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) provide mobile, precision-guided fires that can engage landing craft, logistics nodes, and airfield infrastructure from dispersed, concealed positions. Ukraine's use of HIMARS against Russian ammunition depots and command posts in 2022-2023 demonstrated the system's ability to impose disproportionate costs on an invading force. In Taiwan's geography — mountainous terrain with extensive tunnel networks and pre-surveyed firing positions — HIMARS becomes exceptionally difficult to locate and neutralize.

The package also reportedly includes the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), a medium-range air defense platform that would complement Taiwan's existing Sky Bow systems and provide layered protection against cruise missiles and aircraft. Patriot missile system upgrades would extend the engagement envelope against ballistic missile threats.

Each month these systems arrive earlier is a month added to training, integration, and tactical development. Military capability is not a binary state — it accrues through the compound effect of equipment, doctrine, and proficiency. A HIMARS battery that arrives in 2027 rather than 2029 provides two additional years of crew training, joint exercise integration, and tactical refinement. The deterrent value of a well-practiced capability far exceeds that of a warehouse full of new equipment.

The Competition Problem

The America First strategy's emphasis on prioritization arrives at a moment when competition for US defense production capacity is intensifying. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East — where US forces are engaged in strikes against Iran and actively supporting Israeli operations — is consuming precision-guided munitions, air defense interceptors, and intelligence assets at rates that strain existing stockpiles.

Chieh Chung, an associate research fellow at Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research, has warned that the US Indo-Pacific Command has "long warned about shortages in its stockpile of precision-guided munitions" and that a prolonged Middle East campaign "could soon begin to affect the U.S. military's own combat readiness, in turn weakening its ability to deter China in the western Pacific."

The arithmetic is sobering. NATO allies are expanding air defense procurement in response to the Russian threat. Gulf states are seeking missile defense systems. Israel's consumption of Iron Dome interceptors and precision munitions has accelerated. Taiwan is competing for capacity with countries that have formal treaty alliances with the United States — relationships that carry binding legal obligations Taiwan's informal partnership does not.

Nathan Attrill of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute frames the potential upside: "The strategy shifts from first-come delivery to prioritization based on strategic relevance and defense investment. Given Taiwan's geography, that could mean faster delivery of key systems and fewer bottlenecks, which is operationally significant." But he acknowledges the uncertainty: "The decision to intervene would still depend on presidential judgement and escalation risks."

Beijing's Counterproductive Response

China's reaction to the December 2025 arms package followed a now-familiar pattern: diplomatic condemnation, military exercises near Taiwan, and targeted sanctions against US defense companies and executives. The Chinese foreign ministry declared that "any company or individual who engages in arms sales to Taiwan will pay the price for the wrongdoing." Beijing sanctioned Boeing, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris Maritime Services, and Anduril Industries founder Palmer Luckey, among others.

The sanctions illustrate the diminishing returns of economic coercion against diversified, large-scale defense firms. Boeing's revenue from China — already reduced by years of trade tensions and the Chinese aviation regulator's preference for Airbus and COMAC — represents a declining fraction of its $78 billion annual revenue. Northrop Grumman conducts essentially no commercial business in China. Sanctioning companies whose China exposure is already minimal does not create new leverage; it confirms that existing leverage has been exhausted.

More consequentially, each round of Chinese military exercises near Taiwan in response to arms sales validates the very threat assessment that justifies the purchases. Taiwan's defense ministry has documented a sustained increase in PLA air and naval activity around the island since 2022, with near-daily incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone. When Beijing stages military drills to protest arms sales, it demonstrates to Taipei, Washington, and the broader international community precisely why the arms are needed. Deterrence is strengthened by the adversary's own behavior.

Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center, notes an additional dynamic: "The current process is slow, cumbersome and draws maximum PRC attention, increasing the likelihood of an intensified reaction from Beijing driven by nationalistic public opinion." A streamlined, priority-based delivery process — if it materializes — could paradoxically reduce the political flash points associated with large, headline-grabbing sales notifications by normalizing the flow of defensive equipment.

The Trump-Xi Variable

The scheduled Trump-Xi summit from March 31 to April 2 in Beijing introduces uncertainty into the arms transfer equation. Taiwan analysts have expressed concern that President Trump — seeking a "big deal" to present ahead of November 2026 midterm elections — might view certain Taiwan-related adjustments as negotiable concessions.

Chieh Chung warns that Trump could shift from stating Washington "does not support Taiwan independence" to explicitly opposing it, or place new constraints on political and military exchanges with Taipei. "Trump may think he has plenty of room for interpretation, but even changes in wording alone could be seen by Beijing as an important achievement," he notes.

History, however, suggests limits to this concern. US arms sales to Taiwan have survived every diplomatic recalibration since 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act — federal law, not executive policy — obligates the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive articles and services. Congressional support for Taiwan remains among the most bipartisan positions in American foreign policy; the December 2025 package received broad support from both parties. A president can modulate rhetoric. He cannot unilaterally override a legislative mandate supported by supermajorities in both chambers.

Moreover, the America First strategy's emphasis on defense industrial revenue creates its own constituency for Taiwan sales. An $11.1 billion package generates significant revenue for American manufacturers, sustains production lines, and supports employment in defense-heavy congressional districts. The strategy explicitly seeks to "ensure that future arms sales generate capital to build up American weapons production." Taiwan's purchases directly serve this objective.

The Hedging Strategy: Indigenous Redundancy

Taiwan's defense planners are not building their strategy on the assumption of uninterrupted American supply. The parallel investment in indigenous defense capabilities — documented in detail in Taiwan's National Defense Report — provides a hedge against precisely the kind of delivery delays and political complications that make foreign arms procurement uncertain.

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) now produces the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile, the Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile, the Sky Bow III air defense interceptor, and an expanding family of unmanned aerial systems. The Hai Kun-class submarine — Taiwan's first domestically built submarine — launched in 2023 and is undergoing sea trials. These programs ensure that even if US deliveries slow or stall, Taiwan's core deterrent capabilities continue to mature.

This dual-track approach — seeking accelerated US deliveries while simultaneously building indigenous alternatives — is strategically rational regardless of the political climate in Washington. It reduces dependency on any single supplier, complicates an adversary's targeting calculus (because indigenous systems don't appear in foreign export databases), and creates institutional knowledge that sustains long-term defense capacity.

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy, whatever its ultimate implementation, reinforces the logic of this approach. Partners that invest in self-defense are rewarded with priority access. Taiwan's indigenous programs are not just a fallback — they are a qualification credential for the very prioritization system Washington has established.

The Broader Deterrence Architecture

Taiwan's defense does not rest on arms sales alone. It rests on the aggregate perception — held by military planners in Beijing — that the costs of coercion exceed any conceivable benefit. Every element that raises those perceived costs contributes to deterrence: Japan's Ryukyu missile arc, the Philippines' expanded basing agreements with the United States, Australia's AUKUS submarine program, Taiwan's indigenous capabilities, and — critically — the speed and scale of American weapons deliveries.

The America First strategy does not guarantee faster deliveries to Taiwan. It creates a framework under which Taiwan's case for priority treatment is strong — arguably stronger than that of any other informal partner. Whether that framework translates into material acceleration depends on implementation decisions, production capacity constraints, and the competing demands of active conflicts elsewhere.

But the signal itself carries deterrent value. A US policy that explicitly links arms transfer priority to strategic geography and self-defense investment is, implicitly, a policy that positions Taiwan near the front of the queue. An adversary evaluating the military balance in the Western Pacific must factor in not just what Taiwan has today, but what it will have in twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months. A prioritization framework that accelerates that timeline — even by months — narrows the window in which military adventurism might appear feasible.

Deterrence is cumulative. Each system delivered, each crew trained, each exercise conducted adds to the aggregate cost an aggressor must be willing to pay. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy does not change the fundamental equation of the Taiwan Strait. But it may change the rate at which the defender's side of that equation strengthens — and in deterrence, pace matters as much as magnitude.

Further Reading

• Fortress from Within: How Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Industry Changes the Deterrence Equation
• The 30% Drop: US Patrols Decline in the South China Sea — and Pacific Allies Respond
• Taiwan's Porcupine Strategy: The Shift to Asymmetric Defense